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Abstract
Regularization, a means for people living with precar-
ious immigration status to legalize or “regularize” their 
status, is a central demand of immigrant rights groups 
across Canada . From a perspective of No Borders, does 
the demand for regularization, while challenging the day-
to-day practices of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
also unintentionally reinforce state power? Historical 
research on regularization programs in Canada suggests 
that regularization programs do not eliminate migrant 
illegality but reconfigure it . In this way, regularization may 
be implicated in processes that both makes and unmakes 
illegality within the context of immigration and citizenship 
in Canada .
Résumé
La régularisation, un moyen pour les personnes vivant 
avec un statut d’immigration précaire de légaliser ou de 
« régulariser » leur statut, est une revendication centrale de 
la défense des droits des immigrants partout au Canada . 
D’un point de vue No Border, la demande de régularisation, 
tout en contestant les pratiques usuelles de Citoyenneté et 
Immigration Canada, ne renforce-t-elle pas aussi invo-
lontairement le pouvoir étatique? La recherche historique 
sur les programmes de régularisation au Canada indique 
que ceux-ci ne suppriment pas l’illégalité des migrants; ils 
ne font qu’en modifier la configuration . De cette façon, la 
régularisation peut être impliquée dans des processus qui à 
la fois font et défont l’illégalité dans le contexte de l’immi-
gration et de la citoyenneté au Canada .
Introduction
Regularization, a means for people living with precarious 
immigration status to legalize or “regularize” their status, is 
a central demand of immigrant rights groups across Canada . 
But what are the implications of this demand? Coming from 
a perspective of No Borders, does the demand for regular-
ization, while challenging the practices of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, also unintentionally reinforce state 
power? Historical research on regularization programs in 
Canada from 1960 to 2004 demonstrates that the regulariz-
ation process is a nation-building exercise . “Regularization” 
is the term most often used by government officials to 
describe programs that offer opportunities for people liv-
ing with precarious immigration status in Canada to apply 
for permanent status .1 Regularization programs, however, 
do not eliminate migrant illegality; instead this illegality 
is reconfigured through the regularization process . In this 
way, regularization may be implicated in processes that both 
make and unmake illegality within the context of immigra-
tion and citizenship in Canada .
The theoretical concept and methodological approach 
of governmentality2 is useful for exploring processes of 
illegalization within the context of immigration policy in 
Canada . “Illegalization” refers to those processes that make 
people illegal: processes that illegalize certain bodies in par-
ticular spaces within the globalizing nation-state system . 
In Canada, we can see the ways in which people are made 
illegal through the classist, gendered, and racist processes 
of selection and exclusion embedded in the Immigrant and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) . The majority of people living 
with precarious immigration status in Canada are people 
who do not meet the restricted requirements of the points 
system, a system that emphasizes particular work skills and 
economic status while also privileging an education from 
white-dominated countries, such as Australia, the US, the 
UK, and others . Unable to access the points system, many 
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have submitted refugee claims or have failed these claims 
and have decided to remain in Canada rather than face per-
secution in their country of origin . Others hold work, visitor, 
or student visas or have overstayed their visas . From a gov-
ernmentality approach, processes of illegalization—the pro-
cesses that make a person “illegal”—can be understood as 
created not solely through state bureaucracies and institu-
tional mechanisms but also through technologies of govern-
ment . Who should be governing, who needs to be governed, 
what social practices need governing, all become thinkable 
and rationalized through social institutions and practices 
on, and of, the self—not simply through official state policy . 
One of the techniques of power in this regime of govern-
mentality is the definition of various categories of deviants 
in opposition to “normal” society .
In Canada, this practice of categorization becomes 
clear in an examination of regularization programs from 
1960 to 2004 . It is through the criteria that determine eli-
gibility for permanent immigration status that definitions 
of deserving and undeserving applicants become think-
able . The legality of a person, then, becomes thinkable and 
acceptable through various technologies of government that 
define and make rational the categorization of deserving 
migrants as opposed to those deemed “undesirable .” This 
in turn legitimates immigration policy that operates under 
the  anti-immigrant discourse of the need to protect the 
Canadian national body politic from possible “foreign” con-
tamination, constructing the Canadian nation as valid and 
pure/purified .
While politicians often consider regularization programs 
to be a “humanitarian act of a compassionate government”3—
a way to deal with the “problem” of illegal immigrants—his-
torical research complicates this view . From 1960 to 2004, 
regularization programs have been characterized as one-
time-only procedures . Generally coinciding with stricter 
border controls and increased enforcement, regularization 
programs often foretell an increase in the production of 
migrant illegality, as legal channels for migration become 
minimized and enforcement measures are increased .
Primary research from a project entitled “Non-Status 
Immigrants: Exploring Models of Regularization,” which 
took place in 2004–2005,4 will form the basis of this 
paper . In this project, the research team, of which I was a 
part, undertook historical and archival research, as well 
as conducted key informant interviews, focus groups, and 
round-table discussions on regularization programs in 
Canada from 1960 to 2004 . In this paper, I will first out-
line the major regularization programs in Canada from 
1960 to 2004 to better understand how regularization pro-
grams reconfigure illegality during this time period . In the 
second section, I examine common criteria for exclusion 
in the regularization process by posing the question: what 
are some of the anti-immigrant and racist discourses that 
have been reproduced through regularization? Through a 
discussion on the politics of regularization in Canada in the 
third section, I elaborate on the idea of illegality as a process 
and expand upon processes of illegalization in the context 
of immigration policy in Canada .
Regularization: The Making and Unmaking  
of Illegality
Within the Canadian context, the term “regularization” 
tends to be used more frequently than the term “amnesty” 
by government officials and immigrant rights’ advocates 
alike when describing programs that provide the oppor-
tunity for non-status (im)migrants to apply for legal immi-
gration status . Rivka Augenfeld, a long-time community 
activist and worker with the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services 
(JIAS) in Montreal, Quebec, notes that government officials 
are highly averse to using what she calls “the ‘A’ word”—
amnesty .5 Instead, government officials are far more likely 
to use the term “review” or “regularization” to describe pro-
grams that provide full legal immigration status to those 
without living without it in Canada . Other immigrant 
rights’ activists, such as Jaggi Singh, point to the politically 
biased connotations of the term “amnesty” as a form of for-
giveness for the supposed wrongdoing of illegal immigra-
tion status .6 The term regularization, however, has its own 
connotations similar to that of normalization as understood 
within a Foucauldian framework—whereby “regular” status 
means those with legal immigration status, while those 
without legal status must be “irregular” within this govern-
mental logic .
The Chinese Adjustment Statement Program (1960–1972) 
is likely the first formal regularization program in Canada . 
This program allowed for Chinese migrants who came to 
Canada without status documents, or with the documents 
of a relative of a Canadian citizen (commonly referred 
to as “Paper Sons”7), to apply for permanent residency .8 
Applicants needed to demonstrate that they were of “good 
moral character” and were not involved in the “industry” 
of “illegal immigration .”9 Chinese communities in Canada 
were active in pressuring the federal government to change 
racist immigration laws that had for decades excluded 
Chinese immigrants, such as the Chinese Head Tax and the 
Chinese Exclusion Act .10 It is estimated that around 12,000 
people were regularized through this program .11
Following the Chinese Adjustment Statement Program, 
the Adjustment of Status Program (in French, Operation 
Mons Pays; in English, also known as “Project 97”12)—the 
largest regularization in Canada to date—was implemented 
in 1973 .13 In the early 1970s, an increasing number of 
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migrants became non-status . This was due, in part, to the 
1972 changes in federal immigration policy when Section 
34 of the 1967 Immigration Act was repealed . This barred 
potential applicants from applying for permanent resi-
dency from within Canada .14 Many community groups 
and political organizations advocated for a regularization 
program, and garnered much public support . Despite the 
narrow time frame—August to October of 1973—tens of 
thousands applied .15 Information about the program was 
widely disseminated, largely through community organiza-
tions .16 Although it is unknown how many were excluded or 
rejected, an estimated 39,000 people were successful .17
In 1981, eight years after the Adjustment of Status 
Program, Haitians living in Quebec fought for and secured 
a regularization program . By 1980, more and more 
Haitians in Canada found themselves with fragile status: 
they had student or work visas, or perhaps had overstayed 
their visa and had become “illegal .”18 As the political situa-
tion in Haiti worsened, Haitians in Quebec began to organ-
ize in order to lobby federal and provincial governments 
for a program that would address their needs collectively, 
rather than on a case-by-case basis as refugee claimants . 
The Office of Christian Haitians played a key role in this 
struggle as well as in campaigns for regularization in 1972 
and 1987 . This group first came together when immigra-
tion laws changed in 1972–73 and Haitian nationals could 
no longer apply for permanent residency from within 
Canada .19 This change left many Haitians without legal 
status, and several non-status Haitians began to be tar-
geted by immigration authorities while attending church . 
The group organized meetings, lobbied government bod-
ies and officials, and successfully increased public aware-
ness through news coverage .20 The 1981 program regular-
ized over 4,000 people . This program rejected applicants 
with criminal records and serious medical problems .21 For 
example, at least one applicant was refused because he had 
tuberculosis .22 This special regularization for Haitians 
in Quebec regularized many people; however, for those 
unknown numbers of applicants who were refused, they 
were now known to immigration enforcement officials 
and subjected to increased measures of detention and 
deportation .23
The Minister’s Review Committee (1983–1985) was a 
program in which non-status immigrants who had lived 
in Canada for more than five years and were deemed to 
be “successfully established and integrated” could become 
regularized .24 At this time, “illegal immigration” was con-
sidered an important political issue by the federal govern-
ment . Several reports were commissioned by the Canadian 
Ministry of Employment and Immigration, including two 
by W .G . Robinson, “Illegal Immigrants Issues Paper”25 and 
“Illegal Migrants in Canada,”26 both of which rejected a 
general amnesty and recommended conditional settlement 
and an increase in immigration enforcement and border 
controls . Through the Minister’s Review Committee, an 
estimated 1,000 people were regularized and an unknown 
number of applicants refused . So-called “illegal migrants” 
were considered an important political issue in the early- to 
mid-1980s, but fell out of political view until around 1994, 
when the issue of failed refugee claimants from moratorium 
countries27 became prominent .
From 1994 to 1998, the Deferred Removals Order Class 
(DROC) regularized several thousand failed refugee claim-
ants who had remained in Canada for three years or more 
without a removal order .28 Refused claimants were gener-
ally stuck “in limbo” because they were from moratorium 
countries . Since China was one of these countries during 
this period, Chinese community organizations in Canada 
began to advocate for permanent residency for failed refu-
gee claimants .29 Groups from Toronto, Montreal, and 
Vancouver, including many non-status immigrants, drew 
public attention to this issue .30 Approximately 3,000 appli-
cants from China, Iran, and other countries were regular-
ized through this program, but many more were rejected 
because they did not meet residency requirements, or had 
criminal records or serious medical conditions .31 Four 
years after the DROC program ended, similar organizing 
began in Montreal, where failed refugee claimants from 
Algeria began to mobilize and demand landed status .
In 2002, failed refugee claimants from Algeria mobil-
ized to demand permanent status and secured a regulariza-
tion program . In the 1990s, many people came to Quebec 
from Algeria due to the violent conflict that has continued 
there for many decades . In 1997, the Canadian government 
stopped all deportations to Algeria as a moratorium coun-
try, yet at the same time many Algerians’ refugee claims 
were refused .32 In 2002, the Canadian government decided 
to start deporting people to Algeria again, after a lucrative 
trade deal was struck between the two countries .33 Just over 
1,000 failed refugee claimants from Algeria found them-
selves at risk of deportation .34 Many non-status Algerians 
in Quebec mobilized to put pressure on the government to 
regularize their status .35 They created the Action Committee 
for Non-status Algerians (CASSA), and worked with allies 
from No One Is Illegal—Montreal, individual supporters, 
and various labour, faith, and women’s groups .36 Forced to 
act, the Canadian and Quebec governments introduced a 
regularization procedure for failed Algerian refugee claim-
ants who had been living in Quebec . While approximately 
900 people were regularized through this program, over 
150 people were refused and continued to face deporta-
tion, most because they did not meet the Quebec residency 
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requirement, had a criminal record or could not afford to 
pay the large application fee for the program .37
From the internal discussions of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, a preliminary draft document was cir-
culated in September 2001 regarding “Special Measures .”38 
The objectives of these special measures were to: “Regularize 
the status of individuals who have established in Canada 
and are not able to do so through normal procedures”; and 
“‘Clear the decks’ for the implementation of new legisla-
tion .”39 Although the “Special Measures” were never imple-
mented before new legislation was introduced with the 2002 
Immigrant and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), many of 
the recommendations of this circulated document resonate 
with regularization programs that had occurred in Canada 
before 2001 . For example, a list of factors that meant to guide 
2001 deliberations included “Clear criteria that is targeted 
and exclusive” and a “Specified start and finish date .”40 
The criteria explicitly mentioned in the document include 
a residency requirement of three years, ability to integrate, 
employment (i .e ., not having used public social assistance), 
and meeting the requirements of medical, criminal, and 
security checks necessary to be landed in Canada . They 
would also exclude those who have remained in Canada past 
the date of their deportation order . Explicit mention is made 
of the targeted removal of unsuccessful applicants .41
Through an historical study of regularization programs 
in Canada from 1960 to 2004, we can explore the ways in 
which populations of non-status immigrants become gov-
erned and governable . Through this governance, a particu-
lar notion of the “good citizen” is created and legitimized . 
While new citizens, or permanent residents in the case of 
many regularization programs in Canada, are constructed 
through the regularization process, the category of the 
“undeserving immigrant” is simultaneously created, upheld 
and managed . As such, regularization programs can be 
understood as being implicated within the processes of 
illegalization . Illegalization works to both socially exclude, 
through such practices as detention, deportation, and the 
closing of legal avenues for entry, and socially include under 
imposed conditions of exploitability and disposability . As 
Nandita Sharma argues, immigration policies in Canada 
tend to uphold a system of global apartheid .42 “Apartheid” 
in this global sense does not mean simply the physical exclu-
sion of a group of people from a territorial space; rather, it 
means their inclusion, via this exclusion, as “illegal” or 
“unlawful .” This categorization ensures the imposed state 
of exploitability through an erasure of legal personhood for 
a specified group of people/workers . The “good citizen,” as 
constructed through the regularization process, is largely 
produced through the criteria that have coincided with 
every regularization program in Canada from 1960 to 2004 .
Criteria for Regularization: Producing/Protecting 
the National Body Politic
It [the Canadian immigration system] is an entire apparatus and 
this system is based on the classification of individuals .43
How are the criteria of regularization programs implicated 
in—and productive of—discourses of racism, nationalism, 
and the purity—in terms of dominant understandings of 
the “good citizen”—of the national body politic? In this sec-
tion, I examine the ways in which the predominant criteria 
for regularization—criminal inadmissibilities, medical 
inadmissibilities, attachment to the paid workforce, eco-
nomic wealth, residency requirements, notions of societal 
“integration,” presence of family, and one’s country of ori-
gin—produce a specific notion of the “good citizen” and, in 
so doing, work to govern populations of non-status immi-
grants in Canada in particular ways . In many ways, regular-
ization programs, as a form of governance, act as a method 
of categorization, separating those worthy of permanent 
residency and eventual formal citizenship from those 
deemed unworthy or dangerous to the national body politic, 
creating justification for their detention and deportation .
Criminal inadmissibility, among the most common cri-
teria used to exclude people from regularization programs, 
is implicated in an insidious and racist discourse that pro-
duces some migrants as a source of fear and danger who 
must be “screened” in order to prevent their “contaminat-
ing” the national body politic . Not surprisingly, criminality 
tends to be the most controversial element in the demand 
for regularization by immigrant rights groups . Some advo-
cates of regularization still accept this criterion as import-
ant and acceptable . However, by accepting criminality as a 
legitimate basis of exclusion, there is a denial of the systemic 
and institutional racism, which has been well-documented 
as existing within the Canadian policing and the criminal 
justice system .44 In particular, it denies the criminalization 
of racialized and poor communities, which in turn upholds 
the prison-industrial complex . For example, several par-
ticipants in focus groups with non-status immigrants in 
Toronto pointed out that this condition does not address 
systemic racism, classism, and sexism within policing and 
the criminal justice system in Canada and in their countries 
of origin . A middle-aged woman of colour who had lived 
in Toronto for several years employed as a domestic worker 
with precarious status demonstrates this concern:
You shouldn’t be punished again after you’ve served your time . 
Plus, not everybody really commits a crime . There’s a big problem 
with false imprisonment and unfair judges . And today is a very 
stressful world we live in; people make mistakes .45
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In this statement, this woman is making two important 
points . The first is that facing deportation after a person 
“serves their time” in prison imposes a double punishment . 
The second point is that criminal justice systems are not 
infallible .
Many non-status immigrants and community activists 
have also argued that criminal inadmissibility is unfair on 
the basis of double punishment . As a non-status activist in 
Montreal pointed out, “We’re humans, we’re individuals . 
And if an individual did some kind of gesture that is crim-
inal then they can be punished through the justice system . 
Why specifically target a whole set of human beings based 
on these criteria, for who they are?”46 Thus, people with 
precarious forms of immigration status, including perma-
nent residency, could “serve their time” in jail, but then face 
deportation afterwards . Formal citizens, on the other hand, 
would only have to “serve time” and are therefore only pun-
ished once .
Historically, regularization programs have also excluded 
people with serious medical conditions . Like criminal-
ity, this criterion is implicated in a nationalist production 
of fear, and reinforces the discourse that constructs immi-
grants as potentially dangerous and diseased—thus need-
ing to be screened, tested, monitored and contained by the 
state . This criterion is also legitimated through a discourse 
emphasizing cost analysis, wherein people with illness 
are considered to be undeserving of permanent residency 
because they act as “drains” on the Canadian system . Many 
people with precarious status described exclusion on med-
ical grounds as extremely problematic, discriminatory, and 
inhumane . A domestic worker of colour with precarious 
status pointed out, “People who are ill should be treated 
equally with others .”47 Several people I spoke with noted 
that many precarious immigrants get sick as a result of the 
unsafe and dangerous work conditions that they are forced 
to accept in Canada . For example, one woman employed 
as a domestic worker pointed out, “Sometimes you get the 
disease here and they want to send you back to your coun-
try . That’s not right .”48 Another explains, “The job that you 
get as a non-status immigrant is a job that is going to get 
you sick .”49 People with physical disabilities, or who have 
chronic illnesses such as kidney disease, HIV/AIDS, leuk-
emia, or tuberculosis, are often found “medically inadmis-
sible” for permanent residency, whether through regular-
ization, sponsorship, or Humanitarian and Compassionate 
applications .
People’s attachment to the paid workforce and their eco-
nomic worth have also been used to exclude certain people 
from regularization programs, either because of the work 
that they do or because of their inability to financially sup-
port themselves and their families . Exclusion based upon 
one’s economic stability is similar to medical inadmissi-
bility in that both depend upon a cost analysis discourse 
for their legitimacy . Furthermore, a cost analysis discourse 
constructs a false dichotomy between Canadian-born 
citizens, who in this framework maintain a valid claim 
to medical care and social welfare outside of the criteria 
established for (im)migrants, and migrant “outsiders,” who 
purportedly have not “paid their dues” and may not access 
these services .
In reality, however, people with precarious immigration 
status do pay taxes, and often perform the underpaid and 
unwanted work that underpins the Canadian economy . A 
fitting example is the work performed by domestic workers, 
whether through the Live-In Caregiver Program (LCP) or in 
the informal economy . Due to the gendered nature of child-
rearing labour in Canada, this work allows many Canadian 
women to pursue paid work outside the home and lets the 
Canadian government avoid the cost of a nationally subsid-
ized child care strategy . The discourse of cost analysis also 
insists on producing people as “drains” upon the Canadian 
system rather than recognizing a person’s essential worth as 
a human being and the multiple ways in which people may 
enrich the world in which they exist . As a Spanish-speaking 
woman from Latin America argues,
All of us work in some form . The woman works in the house, the 
children work towards the future, because studying is a form of 
working . We all give many, many things back to the country . For 
this reason, it doesn’t seem fair [to exclude people who are not 
formally employed] … everyone works .50
With this statement, she is insisting that all members of 
a community hold intrinsic value within that community, 
regardless of cost analysis arguments that especially target 
(im)migrants to the contrary . The general sense of all focus 
groups with non-status immigrants in Toronto was that 
people who cannot always do paid work (for example, people 
with disabilities, single mothers, elderly people) should not 
be excluded from regularization programs . Exclusion on 
the basis on lack of employment does not take into account 
that many people have to live with restrictions that limit 
their ability to access paid labour .
Community activists and non-status immigrants alike 
criticized regularization programs that would only allow 
applicants to obtain temporary work permits, such as 
the one proposed by the Greater Toronto Home Builders’ 
Association (GTHBA) and the Construction Recruitment 
External Workers Services (CREWS),51 because they can-
not provide the security and stability that permanent resi-
dency offers . As a front-line worker at a counselling and 
settlement centre noted, “I’ve had people who’ve done these 
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work permits and they think they’re legal . No—in two 
years time you’re going to have to renew .”52 Commenting 
on temporary work permit programs, a Spanish-speaking 
woman originally from Latin America with precarious 
status stated:
This certainly seems like a double-edged sword to me . Because 
they tell you something, but it has a double meaning . And the 
double meaning is that they’re going to attract and tempt you [to 
make yourself known, to apply], and they’re not going to pass or 
accept everyone . So, you give or send them all your information, 
and then when they get to your case they might or might not give 
it to you . So to me this seems like a double-edged sword; it does 
not work for me, nor for my family, nor for my friends … My 
choice—what I would like—is a definitive thing, that is not some-
thing where for 3 or 4 years I am calm, and then I only have two 
months before I return to being driven crazy again . And I face the 
same risks again … So for me it needs to be definitive, for today 
and for the future .53
In this statement, this woman is drawing attention to the 
need for a regularization program that does more than sim-
ply legalize and identify workers within a limited time frame . 
As she points out, there is little to gain and a lot to lose for 
non-status immigrants who make themselves known and 
identifiable to immigration enforcement authorities with-
out at least the chance of gaining permanent residency . As 
well, people holding work permits are generally dependent 
on a valid contract with an employer, leaving workers who 
may have work permits but do not have permanent resi-
dency open to abuse by employers .54 Work permits simply 
do not address the long-term needs of non-status workers 
and their families .
Residency requirements are another means of exclusion 
from regularization programs . An example of this criterion 
would be requiring applicants to have resided in Canada 
for a particular period of time or to have arrived in a cer-
tain location before a certain date, such as in the case of the 
2002 regularization for Algerians residing in Quebec . Like 
criminal checks and medical conditions, this requirement 
is implicated in an exclusionary nationalist discourse that 
demands loyalty and proof of belonging from those viewed 
as outsiders or foreign to the national body politic . Several 
people with precarious status that participated in our 
research argued that length of residency should “count for 
something .” For instance, one Portuguese-speaking woman 
originally from Brazil argued, “The amount of time that a 
person worked and lived decently, that you worked, paid 
taxes, were involved in the community, that you were in the 
country all counts .”55 However, others argued that everyone 
should be included in a regularization program, [or at the 
very least accounted for while waiting to meet the residency 
requirements, if there is a minimum amount of time one 
must have been living in the country before they are eligible 
for permanent residency], “During that time the person 
should be given some kind of security in order to live here . 
For example, if you go to the bank [without legal status] 
you are told you cannot open an account because your SIN 
starts with a 9 .”56 One woman responded, saying, “Perhaps 
during that time the person should be given a permit to 
prove to Canada that you can be useful . After those three 
years then you should be given your papers . It is important 
to have some kind of stability during that time .”57 Another 
Spanish-speaking woman with precarious status pointed 
out people who are deported after living in Canada for 
many years often experience removal as traumatic:
Why does Canada not see the situation of the children of the 
people who live here? After three or four years the child here 
learns the language, learns the customs and then to return him 
back to his country of origin does very strong damage . It is a 
psychological damage .58
As indicated in this statement, long-term non-status resi-
dents of Canada living with the condition of deportability 
often experience removal in a dual sense: physically, from 
the national territory, and psychologically, as this woman 
points out, from the national body politic and, therefore, 
also they are removed and excluded from a sense of national 
belonging . In sum, residency requirements, whereby appli-
cants must prove residency in Canada for a certain number 
of years, serve to keep people with precarious immigration 
status in a state of “illegal limbo” in which exploitation by 
employers, landlords, and others can continue as long as 
vulnerability to the twin disciplinary practices of detention 
and deportation remain .
Having family members living in Canada has also been 
used as a common criterion in regularization programs . 
People with precarious status as well as community agency 
workers have argued that the definition of family in the 
Canadian immigration system is narrow and exclusion-
ary . Countering the narrow definition of family used by 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, one woman of col-
our from the Caribbean defined family as “anybody in the 
community who has helped you and stood by your side .”59 
Another woman with precarious status noted, “Most 
people come here without any family .”60 Furthermore, the 
Canadian immigration system tends to privilege the patri-
archal hetero-nuclear family, while queer, single parent, and 
non-nuclear families are likely to be excluded, whether offi-
cially or informally . As a community health centre worker 
noted:
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Issues around sexuality and sexual orientation are almost never 
mentioned in these kinds of policies . The level of closeting and 
fear that people face in order to hide their sexual orientation and 
try to ‘get in’ as a straight person, is just … We don’t even know 
how much that’s going on .61
Heterosexuality is often presumed as the norm in many 
immigration policies, such as the family sponsorship pro-
gram—and regularization programs are no exception . 
Similarly, the application process is gendered as it tends to 
be centred on the “man of the family .” As one worker at a 
neighbourhood centre pointed out, “Immigration is very 
patriarchal, and they always assume that the man is going 
to be the principal applicant . So then it’s in the hands of the 
man to be responsible for [his wife], and it’s like a favour 
for her .”62 The criterion of family, and the often patriarchal, 
heterosexist assumptions plaguing immigration policies in 
general, can be understood as another way in which women, 
trans, and queer migrants may be excluded within a regu-
larization program .
Regularization programs have at times also included 
“integration” as a central criterion for eligibility . Some 
people with precarious status thought that this was, in 
some ways, a fair condition . At the same time, many also 
pointed out that due to time constraints it can be difficult to 
get involved in activities that are generally associated with 
integration, such as the learning of one of the two official 
languages of Canada (English or French), going to church 
and volunteering with community organizations . One par-
ticipant summarized this by saying that after working many 
hours of overtime and looking after your family, “there is 
very little time left for integrating .”63 One woman rejected 
the criterion of “integration” altogether, saying, “Who cares 
how well you get along! People are people .”64 The criterion 
of “integration” can be understood as largely discretionary 
and arbitrary . Community workers and immigration legal 
workers pointed out in interviews that immigration officers 
will often decide what “integration” means on a case-by-
case basis .
Several regularization programs in Canada have focused 
on a particular group of people coming from a specific 
country . When discussing the criterion of country of origin, 
many people with precarious status pointed out the systemic 
racism within the current immigration system, whereby 
certain groups of people (e .g ., white immigrants from the 
UK) tend to be treated differently than other groups of 
people (e .g ., Black immigrants from the Caribbean) . As one 
woman said: “We [Black immigrants from the Caribbean] 
are treated differently . And they [white British immigrants] 
act as if they’re born here .”65 Others mentioned that many 
people escaping violence and persecution are not recognized 
as refugees because the Canadian government has decided 
ahead of time that their countries are not dangerous . For 
instance, one woman pointed out,
Because you come from the Caribbean, they just look at you and 
say how can you be a refugee? I’m suffering and I’m struggling, 
and I’m being battered and abused and mistreated and raped and 
everything you can think of but my country doesn’t show up on 
the list .66
This statement highlights the precarity of temporary status 
in Canada, especially as one moves from the relative sta-
bility of the position of refugee claimant to that of a failed 
refugee claimant who will likely face removal procedures 
in the near future . This example points to the failure of the 
refugee determination system to recognize many people 
who come to Canada seeking refuge as political refugees, 
especially when they are seeking refuge from a nation-state 
with which Canada has lucrative economic relationships . 
Most participants felt that a regularization program should 
accept applications from all non-status immigrants on an 
equal basis, regardless of their country of origin .
Distinguishing the criminal from the good, the dis-
eased from the healthy, the lazy from the hard-working, 
the newly arrived from the loyal, those who do not belong 
from those who do belong, the regularization process is 
a nation-building practice . Not only are the purportedly 
“weak” sorted from the “strong” applicants, the national 
body politic must be protected from those deemed “unsuit-
able” subjects within the national territory . The technolo-
gies of detention and deportation are used to further con-
tain and remove rejected applicants . Yet, they are also used 
as disciplinary tactics within a system in which precarious 
or “illegalized” immigrants are legally and systematically 
denied access to the rights and entitlements that fully legal 
residents of Canada are afforded thereby enforcing an era-
sure of their legal personhood and attempting to limit their 
social and political participation within the social spaces 
of illegality .
Illegality and the Politics of Regularization
How do people become illegalized in Canada? Illegality can 
be better understood when examined as the product of a set 
of processes rather than as a given state or status . As dem-
onstrated above, regularization programs are one of several 
processes that produce and reconfigure illegality in the con-
text of immigration in Canada . While the flow of migratory 
labour tends to be understood and produced through state 
policies and practices as the sole responsibility of the indi-
vidual, conditions of poverty, unemployment, displacement, 
and other consequences of capitalist globalization should 
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be recognized as central factors of global migrations .67 As 
a refugee agency worker pointed out:
It’s also a situation of the contradiction between growing global 
inequalities and tightening borders … There’s the situation of 
undocumented people already here, but there’s the ongoing pro-
cess as well, of migratory pressures and how you get in if there 
aren’t any legal avenues for people . If you don’t fit the refugee 
definition, maybe they’re not life-threatened in a political way 
but they’re life-threatened because their social rights are not pro-
tected in their country of origin .68
A woman with precarious status described an example:
I know a case of a woman with two children . She applied for [refu-
gee status] and they were denied but the children are studying 
here, they speak the language . That family is illegal . Do you think 
that is legal? Can Canada really say that it is one of the countries 
with more humanitarian sense? That person worked, paid taxes, 
all that she wanted was an opportunity because in her country 
she was a victim of domestic violence . She came here to give her 
children a better life .69
Sassen argues that large-scale global migrations are struc-
tured through various transnational and geopolitical pro-
cesses (including colonial and de facto colonial relation-
ships) that can only be partially regulated through national 
immigration controls .70 With this understanding, we can 
see how global migratory flows become one of the pro-
cesses of illegalization in Canada . Sassen points out that 
because global migratory flows occur regardless of national 
immigration controls, fears of a “control crisis,” or the 
“flooding” of migrants into a national territory, are largely 
unwarranted .71 This indicates that migrants will arrive 
in Canada regardless of legal avenues for entrance . As 
Sassen notes, when one avenue of legal entrance is closed 
off or minimized, numbers will increase via other chan-
nels .72 Changes in immigration policy, such as the repeal 
of Section 34 of the 1967 Immigration Act in 1972 that 
barred potential applicants from applying for permanent 
residency within Canada, have led to an increase in people 
losing opportunities for full legal immigration status . Since 
regularization programs have tended to coincide with 
the tightening of legal avenues of entrance and increased 
measures of immigration enforcement, the implication is 
that the population of migrants entering through illegal 
or semi-legal channels (e .g ., visa-holders who will stay 
after visas expire; failed refugee claimants who remain in 
Canada) will likely increase .
The consequences of global capitalism, such as displace-
ment, poverty and unemployment, are among the driving 
forces behind global migration . Global capitalism is, in 
many ways, dependent upon a system of global apartheid, 
and this global apartheid is reproduced through global 
migrations . Sharma calls into question whether citizenship 
regimes are simply exclusionary; instead she examines the 
tendencies of a nation-state system of global apartheid to 
include via an exclusionary framework . She writes, “[L]ike 
past forms of apartheid, global apartheid is not based on 
keeping differential people apart but instead, on organizing 
two (or more) separate legal regimes and practices for dif-
ferentiated groups of people within the same space .”73 The 
existence of global apartheid is often denied, Sharma argues, 
because it continues to be associated with “race”-based legal 
differentiations and there are almost no legally based “race” 
distinctions found in immigration law today . The nation-
state system of global apartheid, however, legitimizes both 
global inequalities and the use of coercive force, such as 
detention and deportation, against non-citizens and also 
naturalizes classed, gendered, and racialized exclusions to 
national membership .74 One of the effects of this system of 
global apartheid is the establishment of a hierarchical sys-
tem in which access to rights and entitlements become based 
upon categorizations of more- and less-deserving migrants . 
Sassen points out that the relationship between the global 
economy and the nation-state is not one of opposition or 
mutual exclusivity; instead, the nation-state system is an 
essential element in the development of capitalist global-
ization .75 As one of the processes of illegalization, global 
migrations also function to fulfill the needs of the national 
economy—satisfying the demand for cheap, exploitable, and 
disposable labour . As a member of the Action Committee of 
Non-Status Algerians explained,
Canada is a country built on immigration . One thing is clear: the 
Canadian government understands this and understands that its 
economy needs the pool of illegal workers, its temporary workers; 
it brings in a lot of money . Immigrants in general are bringing in 
a lot of money .76
In conversation, two women with precarious status point 
out:
A . There is a lot of propaganda in South America that 
Canada wants to bring immigrants . Why, instead of 
bringing more people, doesn’t it regularize everybody 
that is already here? There are people who are already 
working and giving to the country .
B . At the same time because they do not give us docu-
ments they make us lie . Then you have to use someone 
else’s social [Social Insurance Number] .77
A system of global apartheid, necessary to the demands of 
global capitalism and serving the needs of the Canadian 
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national economy, is both productive of and dependent 
upon processes of illegalization .
Immigrant rights’ advocates have sought to change the 
policies and practices of the immigration system within 
Canada as demonstrated above in regard to regulariza-
tion programs . Currently, immigrant rights’ activists tend 
to point to inadequacies within the refugee determination 
system and the lack of viable options for non-status immi-
grants to obtain permanent residency . At present, the only 
procedure that allows non-status immigrants in Canada to 
apply for legal immigration status is to make an application 
on Humanitarian and Compassionate (H & C) grounds 
for landed status . With an estimated 5 per cent success 
rate for applicants, according to the community workers 
and migrant justice activists I spoke with, this program is 
not acceptable to many immigrant rights’ groups because 
it does not offer an adequate solution for people living and 
working in highly exploitable and vulnerable conditions . 
The H & C application focuses predominantly on integra-
tion, having family members in Canada, and paid employ-
ment . Automatic inadmissibility found through medical, 
criminal, and security checks denies many potentially suc-
cessful candidates the opportunity to obtain legal status . 
For example, Avvy Go, a lawyer with the Chinese Canadian 
Legal Clinic in Toronto, ON, noted that a common medical 
problem that makes people inadmissible for landed status is 
kidney disease:
Kidney [disease] is just one example … [one client] had a positive 
H & C, but was not landed because of medical [criteria], right? So 
by then his kidney is getting even worse . He needs a transplant . So, 
they [Citizenship and Immigration Canada] know that if he goes 
back to China he will die because he’s not going to get a trans-
plant . That’s part of the reason why they allow him to stay on H 
& C grounds . But then they can’t land him because of a medical 
problem, right? Why is that fair, why is that a criteria, knowing 
that this person otherwise meets all the criteria that is set up?78
Another avenue for permanent residency from within 
Canada is through a refugee claim . However, a major flaw 
recognized within the Immigrant and Refugee Board 
(IRB), the governmental bureaucracy that makes decisions 
on both claims for permanent residency on humanitar-
ian and compassionate grounds and claims for refugee 
status, is the lack of an “in-person” appeals process for 
refugee claims . This is despite the fact that under the 2002 
Immigration Act the implementation of a Refugee Appeals 
Division is required by law . In other words, an appeals pro-
cess in set out in policy but has yet to be institutionalized 
in practice .
As a worker at a community health centre pointed out, 
many of the current policies of Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada produce migrant illegality because people “fall 
through the cracks” of the current system:
It’s our current immigration law that makes a lot of people fall 
through the cracks and become undocumented in the first place, 
so if you’re sort of abiding by the same criteria, there are lots of 
people that are going to fall through the cracks [of the regulariza-
tion process] .79
A significant consequence of policies implicated in the pro-
duction of processes of illegalization is that people who 
“fall through the cracks” are then “socially include[d] under 
imposed conditions of enforced and protracted vulnerabil-
ity .”80 Immigration policy, due to the need to sort and clas-
sify populations of migrants, is a process of illegalization . 
The current governmental organization of the immigration 
system, then, is in itself productive of migrant illegality .
De Genova writes, “The social space of ‘illegality’ is an 
erasure of legal personhood—a space of forced invisibility, 
exclusion, subjugation, and repression .”81 Thus, illegality 
is a spatialized condition in which the physical borders of 
the nation-state are reproduced within the everyday lives of 
racialized immigrants in countless locations .82 For example, 
a Toronto Star article reports that federal immigration offi-
cers with an order to deport acted to remove children who 
were attending two Toronto schools in April 2006 . In one of 
these cases, the effect of the officers’ action was to force the 
children’s parents out of hiding .83 Another article reveals 
that when immigrant women without full legal immigra-
tion status in Canada attempt to press charges on abusive 
partners, they often face detention and deportation .84 These 
examples allude to a process of illegalization manifested in 
policies, codes, regulations, and practices in which state 
borders are revealed within the territorial borders of the 
nation-state . As Sharma has pointed out, the border is not 
just a physical geographic territorial marker .85 Instead, the 
border exists wherever non-status immigrants may come 
into contact or confrontation with institutional settings—
whether enrolling children in school, stopped for a traffic 
violation by police, or asked for a SIN card when applying 
for a job . This is an ideological border that arises, emer-
ging as widespread and ever-present, when people try to 
access social services such as heath centres, social housing 
co-operatives, schools, food banks, welfare offices, police 
stations, and others . Ideological borders function within 
and beyond the scope of citizenship to make the whole of 
a person, in effect, illegal . As such, borders (both physical 
and ideological) affect not only one’s legal and political 
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“rights,” but are also implicated in notions of who “belongs” 
and who does not .86
Conclusions
The history of regularization in Canada from 1960 to 2004 
demonstrates the ways in which migrant illegality is recon-
figured through immigration policies such as regularization 
programs . Migrant illegality is produced when people are 
categorized through the eligibility criteria historically asso-
ciated with regularization . Thus, the so-called “problem of 
‘illegal’ migrants” is not “solved” in any long-term sense but 
rather managed through the differential categorization of 
migrant populations as those deemed desirable and those 
deemed undesirable—with the desirability of an applicant 
determined through the use of strict criteria . The act of pro-
ducing the “good citizen” through regularization, then, can-
not be separated from the production of illegality in those 
persons excluded from the regularization process . Excluded 
from the nation, those who are rejected are often subject to 
increased and intensified measures of immigration enforce-
ment, such as detention and deportation . These heightened 
enforcement measures often ensure the swift physical exclu-
sion of undesirable applicants . Meanwhile, threats of deten-
tion and deportation maintain the enforced inclusion of 
non-status immigrants through conditions of exploitability 
and the disposability .
In Canada, regularization programs have historically 
been implemented through the use of strict criteria, such 
as criminality, medical health, employment, residency, inte-
gration, family, and country of origin, among others . De 
facto criteria such as economic wealth, racialization, and 
discrimination against anyone deemed to not be hetero-
sexual also come into play through application fees, and 
the consideration and evaluation of such criteria as “inte-
gration” within Canadian society and the co-residence of 
those defined as “family” in Canada . It is thus through both 
explicit and implicit criteria that applicants become excluded 
from regularization programs . Regularization programs, 
through the application and evaluation processes, produce 
and reproduce xenophobic and nationalist discourses . The 
immigrant becomes constructed as a source of fear, danger, 
and disease; as something to be screened, tested, monitored, 
contained, and deported in order to ensure the health of the 
national economy and to prevent the contamination of the 
national body politic .
Despite the risks involved in advocating for a regular-
ization program, the demand for “status for all” remains 
one of the key struggles of many immigrant justice organ-
izations across the country, including No One Is Illegal 
(in Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal), the Solidarity Without 
Borders coalition (Montreal), and several others . Yet, to 
advocate for a regularization program is to participate in 
a nation-building exercise; to ask the state to reassert itself 
and make decisions about who is desirable and who is 
undesirable . On the other hand, a regularization program 
would have a huge impact on the lives of possibly tens of 
thousands of people who would no longer have to live with 
the twin threats of detention and deportation .
One way that migrant justice activists have addressed 
this concern with regularization is to work towards “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” or “Access without Fear” policies within 
municipalities, demanding that city services be made 
available for all residents regardless of their immigration 
status . This follows in the footsteps of several campaigns 
in the US that have created “sanctuary cities” to varying 
degrees . Cities across the US have adopted variable reso-
lutions that in many ways challenge federal immigration 
laws; indeed, some have referred to themselves as “sanctu-
ary cities” or “safety zones .”87 Over fifty cities have passed 
legislation that forbids the use of municipal funds, resour-
ces, and workers for the enforcement of federal immigra-
tion laws . Others, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Portland, 
Seattle, New York City, and Minneapolis, to name a few, 
have taken more proactive roles, whereby specific legis-
lation bars city workers from inquiring into and/or dis-
seminating immigration information regarding persons 
using city services .88 Resolutions passed in Baltimore, 
Austin, Cambridge, and other cities affirm that no city 
service will be denied on the basis of formal citizenship 
status .89 These changes in municipal policy were not 
“granted” by municipalities; rather, these transformations 
were hard-won by immigrants, refugees, and their allies 
through hard work, research, networking, and advocacy . 
These campaigns work towards creating communities that 
are not dependent upon formal citizenship as a marker of 
belonging .
Through such practices, the social space of migrant 
illegality, while certainly not abolished, is remade through 
the establishment of (porous) city boundaries . Municipal 
policies affirming the right to public services for all mem-
bers of the metropolis pose an important challenge to state 
definitions of “illegality” in the context of immigration 
status . As noted above, the physical borders of the state are 
reproduced in countless scenarios within the territory of 
the nation-state . Many of these situations wherein borders 
are frequently reproduced—attending school, going to the 
hospital, applying for social housing, accessing emergency 
shelter services, and calling for police assistance—would be 
circumvented to a great extent through a municipal policy 
that rescinds discrimination based on immigration status 
and ensures access to services without fear of immigration 
enforcement measures .
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At the same time, however, it is important to recognize 
the very real impact that access to formal citizenship has 
on people’s everyday lives . As Monica Varsanyi points out, 
“the legal right to remain must not be considered insignifi-
cant .” (emphasis added)90 Even within a city that affirms 
access to city services regardless of formal citizenship, 
federal authorities are not barred from enforcing federal 
immigration laws—arresting, incarcerating and deporting 
those persons not deemed acceptable within the national 
body politic . The demand for a regularization program 
and the movement towards “sanctuary cities” are two vital 
goals within the migrant justice movement in Canada, yet 
both have with significant limitations . Activists and schol-
ars concerned with migrant rights can also examine the 
ways in which systems of immigration selection are sys-
tems of hierarchical classification that, in turn, uphold a 
system of global apartheid and global capitalism . The vital 
goals of “status for all” and “sanctuary cities” must not be 
understood as an end to a radical politics of immigration, 
but only a beginning in a long-term fight for global justice, 
freedom of movement, and a rejection of the nation-state 
system, one that must be taken up within the contexts of 
colonialism in which they emerge, and with a commitment 
to indigenous solidarity .
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